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ABSTRACT

Using as an example the relations between the state and the mass media in Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, this paper asserts that in regard to state/media relations, a theoretical middle course exists between the two most common perspectives, the structuralist-functionalists/chroniclers of history and the Marxists. The paper claims that this middle course illuminates variations in the character of state interventions with respect to the mass media, variations both over time and among institutions. The paper proposes that (1) it is the state's relations with "all" the major classes in a particular social formation and the particular configuration of those classes that determine the state's interests in controlling the media, not simply its relation to a dominant or ruling class; and (2) both the class character of the persons/organizations originating mass-mediated messages and the class character of their intended audiences independently contribute to determining the degree of severity of state interventions. The paper sets forth the outlines of a theoretical argument grounding these propositions, identifies a series of specific hypotheses, and tests them against the evidence of the aforementioned particular case, Kenya. The paper finds that the described patterns of state/media relations offer general support for the specific expectations suggested by the theoretical framework, although they by no means provide an unambiguous confirmation. One hundred and one notes are included, and 48 references are appended. (MS)

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STATE/MEDIA RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS: THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

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State/Media Relations in Developing Nations: The Case of the Republic of Kenya

I. INTRODUCTION

Most of the academic literature that has addressed the question of the relation between the state and media institutions in the developing nations has done so from a perspective that has treated the state as a structurally neutral actor with respect to the social classes served by these media. This neutrality is conceived as either beneficent or malign. For proponents of structural-functionalist or "systems" theories of the role of mass media in development, the state is an integral yet disinterested mechanism within the larger structure of society, whose chief function is the processing of exogenously determined demands for social goods and whose sole interest lies in optimizing the efficiency with which the larger system operates.[1] For chroniclers of the history of "press freedoms" in the developing world, the state is simply the embodiment of state power to control, and the motives of its actions are seldom pursued further than the interests of the holders of power themselves, conceived as individuals or as bureaucrats.[2]

The chief alternative to such views of the state is that found in much Marxist scholarship on the mass media. In this tradition, the linkages between the state and dominant classes is a central theoretical point, but the question of the relations between the state and media institutions is rarely the focus of attention. Mass media are commonly assumed to be under the

control of the dominant class, and it is therefore taken for granted that their function is to sustain and reproduce ideological domination.[3]

This paper asserts that a theoretical middle course exists between these two perspectives--one that can usefully illuminate variations in the character of state interventions with respect to the mass media, variations both over time and among institutions. The analysis put forward here rests on two fundamental general propositions.

> 1. It is the state's relations with <u>all</u> the major classes in a particular social formation and the particular configuration of those classes that determine the state's interests in controlling the media, not simply its relation to a dominant or ruling class.
>
> 2. Both the class character of the persons/organizations originating mass-mediated messages and the class character of their intended audiences independently contribute to determining the degree of severity of state interventions.

The present paper sets forth the outlines of a theoretical argument grounding these propositions, identifies a series of specific hypotheses, and tests them against the evidence of a particular case, the relations between the state and the mass media in the Republic of Kenya in the 1960s and '70s.[4]

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

At the core of state/media relations lie two questions: what is the state's fundamental project and how do the practices of mass-media organizations impinge upon it? In answering the first question, I follow in broad outline the familiar Marxist account which suggests that the state's principal concern is to assure the reproduction--that is, the continued existence--of the social

formation over which it has sway.[5] The fundamental requirements of social reproduction impose two basic projects on state agents and institutions. The first is to secure the economic conditions of reproduction, which within capitalism means at least securing conditions permitting continued accumulation of capital by the capitalist class. The second basic project is to secure the political conditions of reproduction--that is, guaranteeing an essential continuity in the social relations among classes such that production (and within capitalism, the exploitation of labor) can continue. This project typically involves interventions to assist the coordination of activities by dominant classes and disorganize attempted political activities by exploited classes.[6] The twin arms through which the state attempts to pursue these projects are coercion and consent.

The concept of coercion is unproblematic. The state seeks a monopoly of the use of violence within its territory and wields that violence when necessary.

The concept of consent is more subtle and is bound up with the often-misunderstood concept of "hegemony." This concept, developed by Gramsci, concerns specifically the ability of a ruling class, through the intermediary of the state, to exercise leadership over the classes with which it is allied and, in particular circumstances, over classes with which it has fundamentally antagonistic social relations. Hegemony is distinguished from domination insofar as the subordinate classes can be said to consent to the reproduction of the dominant class's continued primacy instead of being overtly coerced into submission. If a subordinate class, in freely pursuing its own

class interests, willingly reproduces the conditions of its own continued domination, that class can be said to be under conditions of hegemony.[7]

Most mass communication theory that makes use of the concept of hegemony tends to reduce the concept to domination through ideology--subordinated classes are somehow coerced through ideology to give their consent to existing social relations. Such an interpretation essentially makes the basis of consent some form of "mass delusion" and amounts to a trivialization of the concept.[8] The present paper, by contrast, reasserts the fundamentally political content of the concept of hegemony by shifting attention to what political scientist Adam Przeworski refers to as the "material bases of consent"--those preconditions at the economic and political levels that make hegemony possible.[9]

The possibility of hegemony rests upon two fundamental preconditions. First, the material interests of a given class must be dependent upon the actions taken by a dominant class and must be potentially satisfiable (above some minimal threshold) through those actions. Second, some institutionalized framework must exist whereby the class in question is assured of some influence upon the process through which their interests are to be satisfied, but wherein the actual results of that influence will be indeterminate within some known limits.

Within capitalism, for example, there are two fundamental preconditions that sustain the hegemony of the capitalist class. First, because of the capitalist system itself, it is capitalists who control economic surpluses a· profit and who make the crucial decisions about reinvestment versus consumption upon which

continued operation of the system depends. Within capitalism, capitalists are objectively necessary to the realization of all classes' material interests. Yet they are not sufficient, for there is no guarantee that the product of investment, paid out in wages and profits, will be distributed in such a way as to meet those material needs. Social actors must still struggle over the particulars of this distribution. It is in the institutionalizing of a stable framework to organize these struggles that the move from domination to hegemony is achieved. This framework is found in the institutions of political democracy, which is the second precondition of hegemony.

The two crucial features of democracy as a hegemonic framework are that "struggles over the realization of material interests get institutionalized [and do so] in a manner rendering their outcomes to some extent indeterminate with regard to positions which groups occupy within the system of production."[10] Institutionalization of conflict means that conflicts are pursued within a framework that permits their resolution in a specifiable range of concrete outcomes, in a manner organized to legitimate certain strategies of action and exclude others. It also means that certain issues are institutionalized as legitimate objects of conflict and others are not. The indeterminacy of outcomes with regard to class positions means that, while the range of possible outcomes may be known in advance, the resolution of each individual's interests requires active participation, within the institutionalized criteria, in order to have an impact on the precise distribution of outcomes. It also means that social actors have recourse to a legitimate framework to affect decisions

regarding their material intersts not as members of a particular class, but as citizens.[11] Przeworski sums up the paradoxical character of this situation succinctly:

> Capitalist democracy...structures political activities as political participation and reduces political conflicts to short-term material interests. It simultaneously generates conflicts over material issues and reduces conflicts to such issues.... [T]he price of hegemony is that certain conflicts must be tolerated, but at the same time the effect of hegemony is that only certain conflicts become organized.[12]

Within conditions of hegemony, then, social conflicts are in fact functional for social reproduction insofar as they are framed as struggles over immediate material interests and insofar as actors accept the institutionalized forms constraining such struggles.

Workers "consent" to capitalist social relations, in the precise sense that they act in pursuit of their material interests in the most effective way that appears available to them--within the institutionalized framework of capitalist democracy--thereby effectively reproducing the conditions of continued capitalist domination and exploitation. By acknowledging their central dependence on capitalists for continued accumulation and investment, they are underscoring the effective <u>leadership</u> role that capitalists play within the social formation.

This understanding of the concept of hegemony allows for a precise distinction between hegemonic and non-hegemonic conditions of class rule. Within capitalism, for instance, hegemony may break down as a result of two interrelated factors, one economic, the other political. On the economic side, workers must experience a minimal degree of success in their institutionalized

conflicts over the investment and distribution of surplus. If they cannot regularly succeed in keeping wages above some minimal point, hegemony will tend to break down. Similarly, if the indeterminacy of outcomes within the political process declines, then the motivation for participation will be removed, and workers may choose to focus their attention on issues other than their short-term material ones. If either of these reasons causes the material bases of hegemony to deteriorate, then state actions to secure social reproduction will become increasingly overtly coercive.

It is important to note that the concept of hegemony is not restricted to relations between fundamentally antagonistic classes such as capitalists and workers. It can be applied as well to the less antagonistic relations between a dominant class and its allies--other classes or class fractions with which it is not in directly exploitative economic relations and with which it maintains a more or less stable alliance. All social formations are characterized in varying degree by such alliances. Furthermore, not all of a dominant class's relations with other classes need be of the same type--some may be hegemonic while others simultaneously could be coercive.

The conception of hegemony elaborated here can be fruitfully applied to analyze developing nations. Two points seem critical, however, in distinguishing the class relations of developing nations from those of the developed capitalist world. First, in many Third World countries, particularly in Africa, a dominant class may not exercise the kind of structural centrality in the social formation, such as the capitalist class enjoys in the

Western democracies, that would directly render all or most other classes economically dependent on its activities. Rather it may only be via its linkages with the state as an economic and political force that such a class may be able to establish and enjoy a hegemonic relation with relation to other classes. While the state may pursue policies that tend to strengthen the economic centrality of a dominant class, it remains a necessary structural intermediary between that dominant class and other classes.

Second, much of what is commonly termed the national development and nation-building activities of Third World states can be seen as attempts to establish precisely those material conditions of consent necessary for the state's establishment of hegemony. States strive to engage all classes in a national economy where state accumulation decisions become structurally consequential for all classes--this is the familiar project of "capturing" the peasantry. At the same time, they seek to establish legitimate frameworks for negotiating the distribution of state-controlled resources, often through complex patron-client networks, in which outcomes are not so preordained as to lead to autarkic withdrawal by rural classes nor to a more profound mobilization for revolutionary change.

It is a central contention of this paper that these endeavors by the state to establish and reproduce conditions of hegemony are among the crucial factors determining the state's relations with the mass media.

At the beginning of this discussion I noted that the second crucial theoretical issue regarding state/media relations is the ways in which media practices impinge upon the state's fundamental

project. If this project is to secure the economic and political reproduction of existing social relations, then media practices become relevant to the state insofar as they are consequential to the continuity of these relations.

Practices that seek to change existing social relations are generally effective only when they are engaged in by organized groups constituted as collective political actors. The emergence of a true collective actor out of an aggregate of individual social agents is itself commonly the result of the dynamic of struggle and resistance encountered when changed social practices bring classes into conflict through the potential challenge they pose to existing social relations. The constitution of collective actors is a difficult and complex process and one in which communication plays a crucial role.

The mobilization of collective action is problematic because of the particular character of the risks and benefits associated with participation. This is known in the language of game theory as the "free-rider problem." With most collective social actions, the benefits of success will not be limited to those who actively participate, although the risks may well be borne only by participants. Thus, while everyone concerned may desire the success of a collective action, it may fail because each actor individually will decline to participate, anticipating a share in the rewards anyway. Overcoming this problem is fundamentally dependent on two factors: establishing a more solidaristic commitment on the part of individual actors ("altering their preference structure," in the language of game theory) and assuring as complete information as possible to all actors, so

they can assess as accurately and confidently as possible the exact constellation of risks and benefits.[13]

In both aspects of the task of overcoming free-riders and forging a true collective actor, mass media may play a crucial role. Where actors are not in frequent interpersonal contact, the existence of mass media is clearly vital. The proliferation of small "underground" presses during periods of revolutionary ferment is eloquent testimony to their importance. The task of changing preference structures is largely a matter of developing in actors a sense of concern and personal involvement in each others' fate. While interpersonal relations and direct shared experiences obviously are essential in this task, partisan political communication may be equally vital. In the task of providing actors with information for purposes of risk assessment, both partisan and commercial media will be significant.

While the preceding paragraphs have focused on the roles the media can play in facilitating collective mobilizations that pose challenges to the reproduction of the social formation, the media can play other relevant roles as well. They can mobilize social groups in defense of the established order at least as easily as they can facilitate challenges; and they can be crucial in <u>disorganizing</u> potential collective mobilizations. The media can foment suspicion within groups as readily as they can build trust, and the information they provide, whether true or not, can be pivotal in determining whether collective actions are attempted or sustained.

If the information carried by the mass media can have system-level consequences in the manner described, it is not surprising

that the state everywhere takes a lively interest in the practices of the media. The state can intervene with regard to the media in a variety of ways, but some broad strategies may be discerned. The simplest strategy is that of banning particular media sources, groups of sources, or possibly an entire medium. A less stringent possibility is the imposition of controls and restrictions on sources, while permitting them to continue to operate. Such controls could either constrain all sources or have selective effects, advantaging those least likely to be a threat to the established order. Such constraints could be directed at the messages themselves (censorship, libel laws, extralegal pressures on journalists), the means of distribution (receiver licensing, postal regulations, frequency regulation), or on revenues (sales taxes, subsidies to particular sources). Most ambitious in terms of seeking to pre-empt the media's role in social change is the strategy of the state itself directly becoming a media source, either by monopolizing an entire medium or becoming one (covert or overt) source in competition with others. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, of course, and in any particular social formation, a combination of types of intervention is most probable.

From the preceding general argument four broad hypotheses may be elicited :

1. If media messages are directed to an <u>audience</u> which could be mobilized as an exploited class, the state's concern to regulate such messages will be greater than if the intended audience is an allied class, which in turn would be greater than if the audience were the dominant class itself.

2. If the media source is located within an exploited class, the state's concern to regulate its messages will be greater than if the source is in an allied class, which in turn would be greater than if the source were in the dominant class itself.

3. If the relation between the dominant class (or the state itself) and the intended audience is non-hegemonic, the state's concern to regulate such messages will be greater than if the relation is hegemonic.

4. Related to this, if the relation is hegemonic, the state's concern will not be to eradicate social conflict or collective mobilization per se, but rather to constrain it to fit the institutionalized channels existing for the regulation of such conflict. This will involve controlling the terms in which information is expressed and interests articulated rather than the suppression of messages.

The following discussion will lay out the basic patterns of state/media relations in Kenya from Independence until 1980 as a test case of these hypotheses. The general strategy will be to characterize briefly the major independent media and then to detail, both analytically and chronologically, the nature and dynamic of the Kenyan state's interventions.

III. THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

In its broad outlines, the composition of the Kenyan mass media has changed little since the end of colonial rule in 1963. The print sector has until very recently been dominated by the same two large press groups, East African Standard Ltd., and East African Newspapers Ltd., each publishing newspapers in both English and Swahili. There are a few notable independent weeklies, published by private individuals and church organizations. There is a plethora of specialized periodicals issuing from a variety of government offices. And broadcasting is in government rather than private hands. This general continuity

obscures, however, a number of important changes that have taken place since independence and that bear on the question of relations between media organizations and the state.

The first critical distinction to draw among the Kenyan media is in terms of the audiences they address. This differentiation is most readily marked by the language in which messages are expressed. Probably fewer than 20 percent of Kenyans have a sufficient mastery of English to seek it out as a vehicle for either print or broadcast messages.[14] As literacy in English is a function of education, which is in turn highly correlated with class position, it is not too great an oversimplification to see English-language media as addressed primarily to those in the petty bourgeoisie and above--broadly speaking, the "educated elite"-- and Swahili media as addressed to the rural and urban popular classes.[15] Over time, this match between language and class is undoubtedly becoming less exact, as the proportion of Kenyans with secondary and higher education increases. Even today, substantial numbers of the urban working class and unemployed probably have a command of English.[16] Still, this was less the case during the 1960s and 1970s. It does not do violence to reality, therefore, to treat the language of communication as an index of intended class audience.

The Elite Press

The principal elite newspapers in the period under consideration were the East African Standard and the Nation. The Standard, however, which in 1963 was the dominant Kenyan daily, quickly lost that position to its competitor. In 1964, the

Standard was circulating in 28,000 copies and its sister daily, the Mombasa Times, in 6,000; by contrast, the Nation's circulation was 20,000.[17] By 1969 the two papers were almost neck-and-neck. The most recent figures, for 1983, show the Standard with a circulation of 45,000, while the Nation had surged ahead to 131,000, almost three times the size of the paper it had trailed 20 years earlier.[18]

The Standard's decline may be largely attributable to its lack of initiative in adapting to the new realities of post-Independence Kenya. East African Standard Ltd. was in the early 1960s controlled by Consolidated Holdings, a holding company funded largely through settler capital. In 1967, the holding company, and thus the newspaper enterprise, was acquired by Lonrho, a British multinational with considerable African interests. Lonrho was not a popular company in Kenya, and was the subject of repeated attacks from the political opposition for its growing stake in the Kenyan economy, obtained, it was charged, through its collusion with politically powerful elements of the Kenyan bourgeoisie.[19] Indeed, in 1971 Udi Gecaga, brother-in-law of President Kenyatta, was appointed managing director of Lonrho East Africa Ltd., the company's local subsidiary. In 1973, Gecaga was elevated to the post of chairman and given a seat on the board of directors of the parent company.[20]

Lonrho's ownership of East African Standard Ltd., and the Standard in particular, was recurrently deplored, starting with political radicals such as Oginga Odinga, who in 1967 attacked the company for its "South African connections." More mainstream figures, too, have lamented the threat to independent journalism

posed by the fact of foreign ownership of the nation's premier media institutions.[21] In the case of the Standard, however, ultimately the more important result of the Lonrho connection may be that it involved the newspaper directly in the political dynamics of the new African bourgeoisie. There is no evidence of editorial interference from London in the editorial policies of the Standard during the Kenyatta era, but there is evidence that the paper was involved in domestic factional politics. Perhaps because of the influence of Gecaga, the Standard seems to have been linked to the "Kiambu Court" faction dominant in Kenyan politics during the mid-1970s. According to Barton, in 1974 Gema Holdings Ltd., the investment company formed by the Gikuyu, Meru and Embu tribal assocation--a group closely connected to the Kiambu politicians--even made a bid to purchase East African Standard Ltd. from Lonrho, although this was declined.[22] In 1976 the Standard supported that faction's unsuccessful attempt to "change the Constitution" to block Vice President Moi's right of succession to the presidency.[23]

The closeness of Lonrho's connection to the Kenyan bourgeoisie may have had consequences for the Standard in another way as well. Because of pressure both from its local collaborators and its political opponents, Lonrho was meticulous, from 1968 on, about Africanizing its local holdings.[24] Whether the increased presence of Africans in the surrounding corporate hierarchy was responsible for the Africanization of the Standard's professional staff cannot be determined from the available evidence. According to Ainslie, however, the staff was almost all Europeans in 1965, while Scotton found two-thirds of the staff

African by 1973.[25] Despite this change, both senior editors in 1973 were still Europeans, and it was not until 1975 that the first African editor, Henry Gathagira, was appointed.[26] By the time of Gathagira's appointment, however, the Nation's lead had become considerable. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the relative lateness of the Standard's transition to African management is linked to the newspaper's stagnation.

The Nation followed a different path from the Standard during the 1960s and '70s, with notably greater success. Even before independence, it had identified its target audience as the African elite, and pursued that audience with vigor. Unlike the Standard, it did not bear the legacy of being publicly identified as a "settler" paper, nor did it have as great a weight of traditional settler assumptions and practices to contend with in the newsroom. The Nation was at pains to manifest a recognizably African public persona. Since 1964 the paper has had an African editor-in-chief, although for some years there were few other Africans on the paper's staff, and the first African editor, Hilary Ng'weno, resigned after a year, calling the job a "thankless task."

The Aga Khan's controlling interest in East African Newspapers Ltd. has led to the Nation's inclusion with the Standard in charges of outside manipulation of the Kenyan media, as well as to charges that the Nation is an "Asian newspaper."[27] Some partial justification for these assertions is provided by George Githii, the Nation's second African editor (1965-68), in an article published after he resigned to further his education at Oxford.[28] While defending the essential independence of his paper, Githii noted several instances where other financial interests of

the Aga Khan had prompted interference with the paper's editorial positions. Moreover, Githii's second resignition from the Nation, following his second stint as editor (1972-77), was directly prompted by editorial interference from the Aga Khan's Paris headquarters in his handling of a domestic story on a local Muslim sect.[29] Yet, by all accounts, these cases of foreign interference in the Nation's day-to-day operations were sporadic and narrowly limited to those cases that touched upon the foreign owner's personal concerns.

As with Lonrho, the Aga Khan seems to have found it politically advantageous to open his operation up substantially to participation by the local Kenyan bourgeoisie. In 1973, East African Newspapers Ltd. became a public stock company, offering shares on the Nairobi exchange. Heath, in 1986, estimated that nearly 50 percent of shares were then owned by Kenyans, although the Aga Khan still retained a controlling interest.[30] Who the local shareholders are and the extent of their holdings is not known, nor the degree to which they concern themselves with the operation or editorial direction of the newspaper. It was to the local company directors that Githii turned for support--and found it--in the struggle with the Aga Khan that led to the editor's 1977 resignation.[31]

Like the Standard, the Nation was involved in the factional infighting that characterized the latter years of Kenyatta's regime. In this case the guiding light seems to have been editor Githii himself, a close friend of then-attorney general Charles Njonjo and an advocate of his and Vice President Moi's position against the Kiambu politicians.[32] Githii's closeness to Njonjo may

have helped to protect him against intimidation from other individuals and factions within the government and given him the breathing space to enjoy his reputation as the most politically outspoken of Kenyan journalists. Although close to Njonjo, he was far from being the attorney general's creature, and differed with him publicly on the issue of preventive detention. The waning of Njonjo's influence in the early 1980s may have undermined Githii's own autonomy. In 1982, then editor of the Standard, he attacked the Moi government over the renewal of preventive detention, prompting presidential and other calls for his dismissal--a move with which Lonrho submissively obliged.

Other English-language publications have until recently existed under the shadow of these two dailies. Two weeklies literally "left over" from the colonial period, the Kenya Weekly News and the Sunday Post, continued to publish until each simply ran out of steam. The News finally closed its doors in September 1969; the Post survived until September 1974.[33] As the last of these settler papers was closing, a new wave of contenders vied to take its place. No fewer than three new ventures were launched between 1973 and 1977. The most ambitious, an evening daily named the Evening News, lasted a year before finally folding in the midst of the parliamentary elections in October 1977.[34] The Weekend Star, begun in February 1976 by a group of Kenyan journalists that included then Minister of Information Mutindo, was undercapitalized and unable to survive.[35] The third venture was Hilary Ng'weno's weekly Nairobi Times, begun in October 1977. This paper, though not financially successful, survived until December 1981, when it closed for six months before being revived

for a final attempt as a daily. That, too, was financially unsustainable, and the paper limped along until it was purchased in 1983 by KANU, the nation's sole legal political party, and renamed the Kenya Times.[36]

Two observations can be made about this series of private initiatives. First, from 1975 on, it was African journalists, presumably with backing from other African investors, who started these ventures into elite publishing. And second, because of the capital requirements to establish a profitable newspaper, where one has to be able to absorb significant losses before showing positive returns, and because of the established positions of the two major press groups, especially the Nation, these ventures were unsuccessful.

The Popular Press

As they have dominated the elite press, the two major newspaper groups have also controlled the market for print journalism aimed at the popular classes. Taifa Leo, published by the Nation group, has been until recently the only Swahili daily, while its counterpart, Taifa Kenya, and the Standard group's Baraza were the only two Swahili weeklies.

Within both press institutions, the Swahili papers have been distinct organizationally from their English-language counterparts, and the elite media seem to have had institutional priority. In the case of Baraza, it had enjoyed considerable editorial autonomy even before Independence, and since 1961 its professional staff has been entirely African.[37] For the Nation papers, the organizational distinctiveness was not always so clear

cut. The Swahili papers of the Nation group actually pre-dated the English-language ones, and Hachten reported that in the 1960s the two organizations shared a common staff of reporters.[38] Moreover, two of the Nation's editors were brought up from editorship of Taifa Leo.

The relationship between Baraza and Taifa Kenya as competitor weeklies, at least as indicated by the circulation figures, seems roughly to parallel that of the Standard and the Nation. Baraza, the longer-established of the two, enjoyed a circulation of 44,000 in 1964, according to Hachten, but had raised that figure only 40 percent, to 61,000, when Scotton studied the two papers in 1973.[39] Taifa Kenya, by contrast, went from 30,000 to 65,000 during that same time, slightly surpassing its rival. Its circulation has apparently remained stable at that level, for Nelson puts it at 68,000 in 1982.[40] But even this degree of competition was apparently too much for Baraza, as the Standard group closed the paper in 1981 for financial reasons.[41]

Taifa Leo, the daily, has also grown substantially since Independence, although the expansion of both of the Nation group's Swahili papers has been slower than their English-language counterpart. From a circulation of 15,500 in 1968, the paper had grown to 25,500 by 1973.[42] It more than doubled its circulation by the end of the decade and has continued to expand, being estimated at 61,000 in 1983.[43] The departure of Baraza in 1981 may have contributed to Taifa Leo's jump in circulation.

Previous researchers have commented on both the editorial autonomy of the Swahili papers and the marked difference in their information content as compared with their English-language

counterparts. Ainslie notes that Taifa Leo tended to be supportive of Odinga and the Kenya People's Union in 1966, at a time when the Nation under Githii was thundering against Marxism.[44] Scotton, in 1972, found Taifa Leo and Baraza much more likely to focus on issues of concern to working-class Africans than the elite papers. Such editorials, however, generally dealt with day-to-day issues, rather than more far-reaching political matters.[45] On one controversial topic, however, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda, he found editorial positions to break along corporate rather than racial-linguistic lines, with Standard and Baraza taking a hard "Africa for the Africans" line, while the Nation and Taifa Leo, the Aga Khan's papers, predictably defended Asian rights.[46]

A critical difference between the English-language and Swahili papers is in the amount and type of news contained in each. Whereas the elite papers, in 12- to 16-page editions, devote about 75 percent of their news hole to "hard news," the Swahili papers, running only four to eight pages, offer only 30 to 40 percent.[47] In place of hard news, the Swahili papers are filled with entertainment features, such as astrology columns, contests, fiction, and self-improvement items. And much of the hard news reporting is devoted to detailed descriptions of crime stories. As Scotton summed up the situation in 1972, "for the Swahili papers the news horizon was low."[48]

Other Voices

So far the publications examined, both "elite" and "popular," have been commercial undertakings staffed and managed

predominantly by members of the African petty-bourgeoisie, in an sometimes uneasy alliance with foreign owners. These owners have entered increasingly into financial collaboration with the new national bourgeoisie, who have participated in these alliances both as senior executives and stockholders.

Besides the government, other independent voices addressing the Kenyan people through mass media have been rare. Other than two Gujerati weeklies targeted at the Asian population, there have been a short-lived political newspaper, a controversial religious magazine, and a series of student publications.[49]

The political journal Pan Africa was started in 1963 with the encouragement of the KANU leadership, but was not formally an organ of the party. Both President Kenyatta and then-Vice President Odinga were early shareholders in Pan-African Press. The paper was dedicated to the Pan-African movement and championed the ideas of Kwame Nkrumah, as well as outspokenly supporting Kenyatta and KANU during the 1963 elections. It was also explicitly pro-socialist, supporting developments in Tanzania and criticizing the increasingly pro-capitalist character of the KANU government. As the split between Kenyatta and Odinga widened, party support for the paper declined, and it foundered in 1965 for lack of advertising revenues.[50]

Although student media have generally a restricted scope, an audience of university students can be important in a country like Kenya where higher education remains a scarce resource. Furthermore, students are more easily organized and mobilized politically than many other groups in society, and their influence can extend significantly beyond the bounds of their campuses, as

their role in the abortive coup of August 1982 demonstrated.[51] Student agitation has been a recurrent feature of Kenyan political life since Independence, and it has just as recurrently been met with harsh reprisals from the state. During the 1960s and early '70s, several student magazines were produced at Kenyatta College and the University of Nairobi. The Lantern, founded in 1965 at Kenyatta College, appeared three times a year; Parchment, a weekly, was founded in 1969. Both had died of "natural causes" by 1973. A more outspoken publication, The Sentinel, also started in 1969 at Kenyatta College was banned in October 1972, following riots at the University of Nairobi. Closed also at that time was the radical magazine University Platform.[52]

The final notable "independent voice" in Kenyan media is the Christian Councils of Kenya and Tanzania's controversial newspaper, Target.[53] This journal, with its Swahili counterpart, Lengo, was started in 1964 as a monthly. Distributed mostly within churches, the paper in its first years dealt only with religious issues. Under the editorship of Rev. John Schofield in 1967, the paper expanded its scope to include political topics, and it attracted attention for its support of Odinga and the Kenya People's Union. In November 1968, the editor overstepped his bounds. After publishing an open letter to President Kenyatta regarding the use of KANU funds for the Kenyatta Conference Center, he was pressured to resign and leave the country.

Schofield's replacement was Reverend (later Bishop) Henry Okulu. During 1969, following the assassination of Tom Mboya, Target was outspoken in its denunciation of the resurgence of mass oathings and was denounced in turn as inflammatory by the

government.[54] The paper was equally critical of government behavior during the crisis that followed J.M. Kariuki's assassination in 1975. During the 1970s, the paper hired lay editors and increased its frequency of publication to fortnightly in 1975 and weekly in 1976.

In contrast to the commercial press, all the above publications have embodied perspectives outside the hegemonic circle dominated by the Kenyan bourgeoisie. Pan Africa and the student press espoused positions on the radical left; Target and Lengo shared a related if less doctrinaire perspective. With the exception of Target and Lengo, which have the legitimacy and resources of a major religious association behind them, none were able to survive for more than a few years. Either economic marginality or political opposition closed them down.

The State's Media Agenda at Independence

The state's overriding concern at Independence was the establishment and preservation of its own legitimacy and that of the social formation. This legitimacy had to be cemented across the potential lines of cleavage of class and ethnicity. The history of the final years of colonialism--the nationalist movement, the armed resistance, electoral struggles, constitutional negotiations--had done much to contribute to the overall legitimacy both of KANU as the dominant party and of Kenyatta as the national leader. Yet the salience of ethnicity as a principle of political mobilization--as exemplified in the clear ethnic divisions between KANU and KADU and the ethnic nature of the power bases of most political leaders--pointed up an important

weakness within that overall national unity. Similarly, the persistence of important political tensions between those active in the resistance movement and those identified as loyalists to the former colonial order underscored another potential political cleavage that could potentially be exploited along class lines as a conflict between the dispossessed and the more affluent.

This situation meant that the state's agenda for the media during this period was positive rather than negative. The media needed to be actively used to persuade people both that their aspirations were achievable through the state's development efforts and that the state would be responsive to those aspirations. Also important to this agenda was the suppression of messages that tended to undercut this overarching priority.

The effects of this agenda can be seen in key areas relating to media. One such area was the elaboration of a new set of ideological formulations regarding the freedoms and responsibilities of the media, meant to justify the efforts of an activist state to use the media to promote its own messages and to impose normative constraints on Kenya's independent media institutions. Another result of this agenda was the decision to take more direct control over broadcasting, by transforming the independent KBC into the state agency Voice of Kenya.

Kenya's political leadership was not alone in feeling that the Western ideology of the press was inadequate to its needs, but was perhaps unusual, at least in Africa, for the relative moderation of the position it set forth.[55] This leadership was largely steeped in the English press tradition. This had been the frame of reference for the colonial administrators and, for much

of the new African leadership, it had formed an important component of the educational system within which they had been raised

Yet the precise discourse was the Western press ideology with a difference. That ideology had been honored in colonial Kenya as much in its breach as its observance. For twenty years prior to Independence, arguments seeking to justify the exceptional suppression of the press had been common in political discourse. Settlers since the 1940s had agitated to suppress a part of the press identified by race and language, and the government during the Emergency had done just that. Neither the settlers nor the state, however, had justified this through a permanent rejection of the Western model, but rather as a temporary exception (however long-term it might turn out to be) based on the supreme requirement of public safety. This general discourse of normative freedom modified by justifiable exceptional repression provided the commonly understood ideological legacy of colonial state-media relations--one which the new leadership was able to adapt to its purposes.

An independent press free to criticize the government was in principle applauded, and the rights of freedom of expression and association were included in the new Constitution. The catch was that the press's freedom must not be "abused." As President Kenyatta explained, in an address to the International Press Institute Conference in Nairobi in 1968, abuse of the press's freedom meant the publication of consistent misinformation or criticism that might "undermine the security of the State." Such practices could not be permitted. Beyond that, he articulated

what he felt was a moral obligation that imposed a positive agenda on the press.

> The influence for good exerted by the Press should here [in Kenya] be rooted in desire to inform and inspire the people. The Press should positively promote national development and growing self-respect. And the Press should always seek to coalesce, rather than to isolate, the different cultures and aspirations and standards of advancement which make up our new Nation.[56]

This same position had been set forth in a speech by a permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting two years earlier.

> The right of freedom of speech is guaranteed by our Republican Constitution. [This] includes the freedom of publishing one's ideas in print....On the other hand, it must be appreciated that this freedom must not be abused....It is...necessary for private newspapers and other organizations to make sure they are in tune with the country's needs. This is not to say that they must follow the Government policies at every step. Indeed, some of them have been critical of certain aspects of Government policies yet they are still publishing. On the other hand, we do keep a sharp look out to see that newspapers are not used to further the needs of some foreign country or group. Also we cannot allow any newspaper to undermine the people's efforts to progress and to build a better life ....Under the Constitution, we must give [newspapers] the right to go on publishing but if they have the interests of Kenya at heart they will make greater effort than they have done to identify themselves with our country.[57]

Three important themes are sounded in both these texts. First, the legitimacy of an independent press is acknowledged. Second, the press's right to be critical of the government is made conditional on its not being "abused," and the state's right to prevent such abuse is asserted. The vagueness of the language and the state's right to decide what constitutes abuse together amount to an ideological justification for almost any act of state intervention. This point is explicitly made by the journalist

interviewing the Minister of Information and Broadcasting for the Nation, May 29, 1966:

> "Q. You said the Press could have freedom provided it criticized constructively. This gives you enormous power since you are the only one who can decide what is constructive and what isn't. Don't you think you have to give a written policy statement on this question...? Otherwise, we would be worried that the Minister for Information could close the door to anything controversial. Don't you think there is this danger?
> "A. Yes, there is that danger, but I would ask you to wait and see the Bill coming before Parliament. Incidentally, this Bill will enable the Government to cancel a license to a particular paper if it feels this would be in the general interest. We hope this will not be very much in use."

Finally, these texts assert the obligation of the mass media to promote the connection between the state's efforts at national development and the aspirations of the people and to avoid exacerbating cultural and other divisions--in short, to promote actively the legitimacy of state and nation.

The effectiveness of this press ideology, from the point of view of the state, rested in both its vagueness and the positive responsibility it placed upon the press to promote legitimacy and development. Coupled with the broad powers of the state to intervene in press activities and the lack of any active tradition of judicial restraint, these elements together cut much of the ground out from under the feet of editors and publishers. Such a situation encouraged self-censorship by journalists as the sole means of assuring that politically sensitive messages would not prompt state intervention.

On the other side, the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of press freedom meant that critics of government interventions and intimidations, both in the press itself and, more importantly, within Parliament, had grounds on which they could defend a

challenge, however pro forma it might in practice be, to particular instances of government interference. While such protests could not avail to overturn such state actions, their prospect might deter the indiscriminate use of state power.

The second important feature of the state's initial media agenda was securing control of broadcasting. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation had explicitly been created as an independent body to protect it from political manipulation by the government. As the Kenya Television Commission, set up in 1959 to study the feasibility of introducing television to the colony, reported regarding its investigations,

> a large majority of those interviewed...emphasized that it was imperative that television should be controlled by an independent body and not run as a Government Department.[58]

Similarly, the ordinance establishing the Corporation in 1961 specifically enjoined it to be an "independent and impartial broadcasting service."[59] Given the European hopes for a multiracial political solution and the success of its model, the BBC, the colonial government's support for such an institutional arrangement is understandable. African legislators, too, had urged the importance of a buffer from government influence as a guarantee of political impartiality. The fact that power was divided between two parties, KANU and KADU, that in 1961 were of roughly equivalent strength, may have informed the calculations of African politicians, as neither party could then be assured of holding the reins of government.

Within six months of Independence, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Nationalization) Act was passed by Parliament,

incorporating KBC within the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism and renaming it Voice of Kenya (VOK).[60] The purpose of the nationalization was to get a firmer hand on what was widely believed to be a powerful medium of persuasion. Broadcasting was to be put in the service of "nation building." Tom Mboya, making the case for nationalization during debate on the bill, stated:

> The Government intends to use the Voice of Kenya for the purpose of building, strengthening, consolidating the new nation of Kenya and educating its citizens to understand their duties, their responsibilities, their privileges, their opportunities and the role they can play in making that nation what all of us want it to be.[61]

African leaders did not have confidence in the political commitment of KBC's expatriate staff and did not want to leave the most potent instrument for establishing and maintaining support for the regime under the direction of an independent body not wholeheartedly committed to their goals. In the Parliamentary debates, the Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Achieng Oneko, argued, "We...believe that for political reasons this Nation cannot afford to have its broadcasting medium controlled by an independent organization especially where such an organization has interlocked interests with outside people."[62]

Nationalization gave the government not only direct access to the largest media audience in Kenya--there were perhaps 500,000 radio sets in the nation at Independence and an audience of more than a million[63]--but control over access to this medium by all other political actors as well. Making effective use of this instrument required various other supportive bodies, which were established within the Ministry. The Kenya News Agency, begun even before nationalization as a provider of information for

broadcast news, quickly grew into a major domestic newsgathering body and a key gatekeeper of international news as well. The agency established information offices throughout Kenya gathering local news and relaying it via telex to Nairobi.[64] In addition, the agency received newsfeeds from foreign news services, initially Reuters and Tass, from which it selected and edited international news stories for VOK. In 1965, a second body, the Presidential Mobile Press Unit, was established to travel with President Kenyatta and generate thorough coverage of his newsworthy activities for both radio and television.

Both KNA and the Mobile Press Unit also functioned as institutional channels of influence over the commercial press. KNA's resources and geographic reach made it an important source of domestic news. Beyond that, both KNA and the Presidential Unit clearly were representing the government's position on the stories covered, and the commercial press knew their best interests well enough to pay careful attention to them. KNA also set itself up as a central clearinghouse for incoming international news as well, redistributing to the major commercial newspapers the same selecton of Reuters and Tass material it provided for VOK.[65] Here, the agency's partisan purposes of serving what it took to be the government's interests was a source of controversy, as expatriate journalists complained of suppression or rewriting of important international stories.[66]

At the time of the nationalization of KBC, the question of access by opposition political forces was warmly debated. While KADU was still a significant force in the summer of 1963, KANU's firm grip on the state is evident in the government's position in

these debates. Heath carefully reviews the positions, citing both KADU politicians and KANU backbenchers who expressed concern that the government would prevent dissenting voices from being heard.[67] The position enunciated by Tom Mboya, speaking for the government, reveals the same self-serving ambiguity about tolerable limits that characterized the government's position regarding the independent press.

> [VOK] is intended to be used for the promotion of what is and must be the interests of Kenya. Now, Sir, if the Opposition were to make a contribution which is in the interests of Kenya it will find a very prominent place in the activities and facilities provided by the Voice of Kenya. If on the other hand the Opposition makes a nuisance of itself, then the Voice of Kenya must expose the nuisance.[68]

Two years later, when KANU's opposition was on the left rather than the right, and was articulating a radical challenge to the political status quo, the ambiguity was gone regarding VOK's impartiality. The Minister of Information and Broadcasting, in an interview, was quite clear.

> When VOK was a private corporation, it gave fair play to both sides, but now it is a Government voice, naturally it will only convey the voice of the Government....[W]e will be impartial as far as foreign policies are concerned, but not internal policies....[I]nternally, we cannot be impartial.[69]

The state's immediate media agenda at Independence was thus to promote its own legitimacy and that of the social order it was helping to establish. To do that it sought to have its agenda carried as far as was possible through all news media, with dissonant voices kept to a minimum. To that end it elaborated an ideology of press freedoms and responsibilities that made support for its positions a priority and justified the silencing of dissent. Furthermore, it took direct control over broadcasting,

arguably the medium with the greatest reach and audience, and closely regulated access to it by dissenting voices.

Internal Divisions 1963-1966

During the years of transition immediately following political Independence, the Kenyan state was riven by important political divisions. The most significant of these, and the one which principally structured the political trajectory of events from 1963 to 1969, was that between the majority, represented by President Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, and the KADU leadership (which in November 1964 dissolved the party and crossed the floor to join KANU), on the one hand, and a sizeable minority of radicals under the general leadership of Vice President Oginga Odinga on the other. The former group sought a broad alliance of petit-bourgeois, bourgeois, and multinational forces, while the latter was pursuing a more populist alliance of petty-bourgeois and peasant forces. While the former political grouping tried to incorporate the popular classes into a political and economic configuration under the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie, in close cooperation with international capital, the more radical forces tried to promote a statist political solution, similar to that initiated in neighboring Tanzania, where the petty bourgeoisie would exercise hegemony through direct control over the state, against both the national bourgeoisie and international capitalist interests.[70]

Between 1963 and 1966, as political factions jockeyed for power in Kenya, the character of this division became more clearly defined and the relative balance of power more settled. By the

spring of 1966, the majority group had maneuvered to the point where it had isolated the radicals both within the government and the party, and they were forced to make a break with KANU and constitute themselves as a formal Opposition party, the Kenya People's Union--a position from which they were deprived of much of their influence.[71]

The significance of these political struggles is that, during the period 1963-1966, the state's relations with the media were similarly divided and contradictory, especially as the person with the most immediate responsibility for these relations, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, was one of the leading radical politicians, Achieng Oneko. Under Oneko's direction, the activities of the broadcasting ministry did not depart from the broad state media agenda described above, but rather pursued that agenda with a distinctive twist, following policies and practices that were repudiated in the post-1966 period.

Oneko and his ministry were as concerned as any within the government and KANU to promote the legitimacy of the state, but the radical forces disagreed as to the nature of the social order that the state should encourage and sustain. Critical of capitalism, both at home and abroad, the radicals were suspicious of a commercial press still largely staffed with expatriates. By the same token, they were favorably disposed to political voices seeking to mobilize the masses for fundamental social change.

The media policies and practices characterizing Oneko and his group in government during this period were, first, an active endeavor to constrain the elite media; second, cooperation with representatives of Eastern bloc media organizations, especially in

the operation of KNA; and, third, support for the non-commercial, political journal Pan Africa.

The efforts to exercise control over the elite media have been alluded to above. They took the form, primarily, of interference in the flow of international news from KNA's wire services and the imposition of an arbitrary balance between Tass and Reuters in the newsfeeds provided to the print media.[72] Also used, apparently, were informal pressures and threats of deportation.[73] Nor were these threats always idle; Hachten notes that several British and one American journalist were deported from Kenya during the first 15 months after Independence.[74]

The deportations and threats were likely more effective than the more formal attempts at control. The elite newspapers were never totally dependent on KNA for foreign news; the Nation, for instance, had independent access to the Associated Press, and both institutions could turn to shortwave radio broadcasts or to news releases from foreign embassies. The government as a whole during this period gave no serious consideration to instituting official controls or censorship over the elite press, although individual members of parliament sometimes proposed such measures.[75]

The tilting of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting toward the Eastern bloc can be read as expressing a distrust of KBC's previous close links and technical dependence on the British government and the BBC, as much as any strong political or ideological affiliation with the Soviet Union. A Czech "editorial adviser," a Russian technician, and a gift of Soviet telecommunications equipment constituted the principal support provided KNA by the East.[76] This relationship was controversial in

part because of its sharp contrast with the pro-Western cultural and political attitudes of most of the rest of the political leadership.

Support for Pan Africa by Oneko and the other radicals within KANU is hardly surprising, as they were among its founders. It is an indication of how much the political center of gravity shifted in the two years after Independence that what had been a favored political journal in 1963 was by 1966 singled out by Oneko's successor in the Ministry of Information as a candidate for suppression by the government.[77]

As the polarization within KANU grew during 1964 and 1965, politicians and civil servants within the majority group worked to isolate the radicals politically. By April 1966, when the radicals' position in the KANU party structure had been smashed and continued participation in the government had become untenable, Oneko resigned, reporting that he was able no longer to control even his own ministry and was being daily attacked in person over VOK.[78] About a month previous to Oneko's resignation, his political opponents had struck another blow by summarily deporting several Eastern bloc diplomats, including the Czech adviser to KNA.[79]

The process by which the Odinga faction was run out of KANU and the government involved a concerted campaign by its political opponents to blacken the group's reputation in the eyes of the Kenyan people. In the early months of 1966, politicians like Mboya, Moi, Ronald Ngala, and even President Kenyatta stumped through the country denouncing the "so-called progressives" as trouble-makers and spreaders of confusion among the people.[80] They

also worked hard to stigmatize Odinga and his followers as Communists.

The relations between the leadership of the majority faction and the editors of the elite media during this period cannot be determined precisely. However, a reading of the Standard for the first six months of 1966 shows that the paper, willingly or not, gave unambiguous support to the campaign against the Vice President. In every editorial during that period that related to this controversy, the Standard came down clearly on the side of the majority and against the radicals.[81] Furthermore, many of these editorials repeated, subtly or boldly, the charges of disloyalty and self-interest, bordering on treason, put forward by the majority leadership.

The treatment by the Standard of one particular sequence of events suggests a degree of collusion with the majority leadership in its campaign against Odinga and his supporters. On March 11, 1966--the eve of the crucial party conference that would decide Odinga's future role within KANU and the same day that 99 members of parliament called publicly on Odinga to resign the Vice Presidency--the government ordered the summary expulsion of six Eastern bloc officials, including the Czech adviser to KNA. No reasons were given for the expulsions.[82] Nothing more was heard about these expulsions until a week later, after Odinga had been stripped of the party Vice Presidency and the intention to found a new party, Kenya People's Union, had been announced. On March 17, three more Eastern bloc officials were expelled, still with no explanation from the government.

On the same day, the Standard ran a long article on the editorial page about the "Soviet spy system overseas," pointing out that "60 percent of personnel in Soviet embassies are intelligence agents." Next to this piece ran an editorial entitled "A Strong Government," which first praised the government for its handling of the KANU conference and isolation of the radicals and then moved immediately to commend it for the expulsion of the Eastern bloc personnel, implying they were spies and criticizing VOK for its silence about these expulsions.[83] A further editorial on March 22 continued this discussion of the Soviet expulsions, still in the absence of any public explanation from the government.' Finally on March 24, the Minister for Home Affairs, Moi, charged that £400,000 had been employed by agents of an unnamed foreign power "to subvert or change the popularly elected government," and claimed that such subversion was still taking place. He went on immediately to attack the newly founded KPU. The front-page story in the Standard reporting Moi's speech nowhere explicitly linked the money either to the Soviets or the KPU, but an adjacent article referred to a report by the London Observer that the Soviet embassy in Nairobi had given KANU dissidents £100,000 to help influence the recent conference.[84] The next day's editorial, entitled "£400,000 of Subversion," while calling on the government for more details, was filled with innuendo. Linking the KPU to the foreign money, it implied the party's leaders were guilty of "organized, deliberate subversion of their own country, which means they are traitors to their President and to Kenya."[85]

Although this issue was raised repeatedly by politicians and editorial writers--notably in a Standard editorial, "Enemies Within the Gates"--no details were ever provided by the government regarding the expulsions even to suggest the expelled officials were spies nor was any evidence provided to demonstrate that the £400,000 had ever existed. While it is quite possible that the unofficial charges of espionage and the nonspecific allegations of Eastern bloc financial support for the KPU were in fact justified, the timing of the expulsions strongly suggests a carefully orchestrated campaign to delegitimize what were completely legal opposition forces within the country. And the Standard's uncritical coverage, intentionally or not, served objectively to further this campaign.

The Crystallization of State-Media Relations

With the expulsion of the radicals from KANU and their decisive electoral defeat in the "Little General Election" of June 1966, the overall character of state-media relations became more unified. Over the next couple of years, these relations took on the basic character they have exhibited since. The significant changes that took place can be summarized broadly as a strengthening of the state's repressive options with regard to the press--powers directed almost entirely toward the non-commercial media--and the evolution of a modus vivendi with the elite media.

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting continued the practice of carefully regulating access to VOK. The KPU was frozen out of both access and coverage during the electoral campaign of 1966--except for denunciations by KANU politicians.[86]

This effective denial of legitimacy to the Opposition was not limited to broadcast coverage. Until the party's banning in 1969, KPU members were subject to an endless barrage of legal and illegal harassment with a view to denying them any access to public forums to promote their political messages. Such repressive actions were not limited only to the KPU--it is during this period, in 1968, that the British editor of the Christian weekly, Target, was pressured to resign and leave Kenya.[87]

In the wake of the expulsion of the radicals, several new bills were pushed through Parliament. At Independence, the new government had inherited several legal resources previously employed by the colonial regime to regulate the press.[88] The Books and Newspapers Act required the deposit of a sh. 10,000/- (roughly US $1,000) bond for publishers of all newspapers (and periodicals appearing quarterly or more frequently), which stood as a security for any potential fines or libel damages and acted as a significant obstacle in the way of persons with weak resources.[89] Similarly the provisions regarding sedition in the Penal Code carried a penalty of up to three years imprisonment for anyone who "prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes or reproduces" any seditious publication, or who imports or even has in one's possession such a publication.[90] Coupled with other provisions that allowed the seizure and possible forfeit of printing presses used to print such publications, such penalties had constituted a serious deterrence to publishers or printers of politically controversial materials, particularly as the definition of sedition, also carried over from the colonial period, was very broad.

Besides these legal resources to control publishing, another section of the Penal Code allowed the prohibition of any foreign publication or periodical deemed a threat to "public order or security, health or morals, the administration of justice or the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."[91] While not constituting a constraint on the domestic media, such powers were potentially useful for preventing controversial political messages from reaching susceptible audiences through foreign channels.[92]

The new bills passed in 1966 extended the powers already enjoyed by the Minister of Information to ban foreign publications and periodicals to include domestic publications and periodicals as well.[93] Additional amendments to the Penal Code the following year stiffened the penalties for sedition and the possession of seditious publications from a maximum of three to seven years imprisonment and the penalty for printing, publishing, selling, (etc.) a seditious publication from three to ten years.[94]

At the same time as the state was taking these steps to strengthen its hand against the press, it was pursuing a more accommodating line with regard to its actual day-to-day relations with the commercial media. Complaints of KNA manipulation of foreign news seem to stop in 1966, and the agency catered to the elite press's interests by adding two more Western subscriptions to its battery of international wire services--AFP and UPI.[95] There were fewer deportations also, although three British journalists were deported in 1969.

The Structure of State-Media Relations

The state's overriding concern with regard to the mass media, as argued above, is the promotion and preservation of its own legitimacy and that of the social order it serves. In the first years after Independence, the emphasis, as we have seen, was primarily on the promotion of legitimacy, as the transformations in economic and political relations that would provide the material bases for the establishment of the conditions of hegemony were only partially in place. The other principal concern was the silencing of political messages that sought to mobilize political actors along the two main axes of social cleavage, class and ethnicity. In its struggles with the radicals, the majority faction strengthened the mechanisms of control, precisely because the radicals tried to effect a political mobilization along class lines.

With the relegation of the KPU to the status of a minority opposition party in 1966 and their definitive smashing in 1969, coupled with the success of the land reform and Africanization programs and marked economic growth fueled by foreign investment, the KANU government had succeeded in establishing, at least partially, the material conditions for hegemonic rule. Significant portions of all classes could identify their own material interests with the continued growth and success of the social formation of the new Kenya, and the patronage networks of KANU and the other vehicles of political influence, such as harambee projects,[96] gave them some avenues, as citizens and as clients, to influence the concrete distribution of material benefits.

Of course, insofar as these material gains rested on an insecure economic foundation, highly dependent on foreign investment and primary commodity prices and under pressure from rapid population growth, this achievement of hegemony was and remains a very fragile accomplishment. Important social groups remained effectively outside the hegemonic circle--the landless, principally, but increasingly also growing numbers of underemployed school-leavers, whose education and aspirations outstripped the ability of the economy to find places for them. Nonetheless, during the 1960s and 1970s, growing numbers of Kenyans lived in economic and political circumstances that, independent of ideology, worked to confirm the legitimacy of state and social order.

This was most clearly the case for members of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie--the readers of the elite press. Thus the state could increasingly afford to allow the elite press a loose rein. Indeed, outside periods of real political and economic crisis, the existence of an independent press acting as a vehicle for the communication of political debate and initiatives was positively functional for sustaining legitimacy, as it tended to confirm readers in their roles as citizens.

Thus the regime's endorsement of freedom of expression for the press, although hedged enough to justify much formal and informal pressure, has been nonetheless generally observed for the elite media. This ideology in fact works pretty well in most situations for all concerned. Government bureaucrats do not feel compelled to be forthcoming with the press, for press ideology in Kenya has never stretched so far as to encompass a "right to

know"; and civil servants and politicians alike have felt free to berate the press publicly for unfavorable coverage, usually on the grounds of "sensationalism." Reporters and editors, on the other hand, know what the boundaries of acceptable practice are: they know, for instance, that reporting political controversies within Parliamentary sessions is generally safe, as is direct quotation of government and party spokesmen, whereas active investigative journalism is risky.

Because of the fragility of the material conditions sustaining hegemony even within the elite, any concerted political analysis in the press that focused on either class or ethnicity would seem to be permanently off limits. And in times of serious political crisis, the state has not hesitated to take firm action against the elite press, although even then it has generally not attempted to justify its actions through the formal mechanisms at its disposal, preferring instead the unanswerable muteness of force. In 1969, for instance, the regime was faced with a major upsurge of political unrest following the assassination of Tom Mboya.[97] Serious agitation within the Luo community threated to split the dominant class alliance along ethnic lines, precipitating a major political realignment. This situation was exacerbated by a defensive wave of solidarity oathings among the Kikuyu. The salience and seriousness of these events to the whole of the elite, indeed the nation, compelled the two elite dailies to cover the issue, and the Christian weekly Target, too, was outspoken in its denunciations of "tribalism." Government and party spokesmen were vocal in turn in their denunciations of these newspapers, and their attacks were carried prominently on VOK.

Finally, after both dailies reported a particularly embarrassing split within the government over the regime's reluctance to move against the Kikuyu, the two senior expatriate editors--Eric Marsden, acting editor of the Standard, and Michael Chester, news editor of the Nation--were summarily deported, along with a third expatriate journalist.

While this incident shows the government's willingness to take strong action against the press, it reveals a number of other important points as well. First, the newspapers knew they were on dangerous ground and, while they felt they had to cover the issue of ethnic hostilities, they tried to keep it off the front pages as long as possible.[98] Second, the government did not take direct repressive action until the heighth of the crisis, trying at first to warn the press off with verbal attacks. Third, the action taken was the deportation of expatriates. No overt action was taken against the papers themselves, nor against the African editor-in-chief of the Nation. Fourth, the government never admitted the deportations had anything to do with the deportees' journalistic activities; Moi, defending his actions in Parliament implied those deported were involved in illegal political activities. Fifth, the action was roundly condemned in Parliament by members of both parties both in terms of the principle of freedom of the press and in light of the contributions both newspapers (and Marsden personally) had made to Kenyan national development; as indicated, the government did not attempt seriously to defend itself--it took its lumps and let the deed speak for itself. And sixth, it appears to have worked. At least to judge from the Standard, the issue of "tribalism" dropped off

the front pages, except for prominent coverage of President Kenyatta's assuring a large delegation of Luo leaders of the government's good intentions. And the next month, when the government went on the offensive in a concerted campaign that ended with the prohibition of the KPU and the detention of its leaders, the Standard stood solidly behind the government's actions and its version of events.

The situation with regard to the popular press is in many ways similar to that for the elite press. In both cases, the principal voices heard through each medium are those of classes within the elite--petit-bourgeois editors and bourgeois and foreign owners. For this reason, perhaps, the government has shown little inclination to take strong action against the popular press. The general "rules of the game" governing both sets of institutions seem to be the same, and the low "news profile" of the popular newspapers makes them less of a threat. In principle, one would expect the state to be more concerned with voices reaching popular audiences, as these are social groups more tenuously held within the hegemonic circle of consent to legitimacy, yet there seems to be no record of state intervention with regard to the commercial Swahili press.[99]

Finally, the state's relation to media voices from outside the hegemonic circle seems clear from the fact that they are so few. Voices of serious dissent do not fall under the protective umbrella of the freedom of the press, at least as the state construes that freedom. Pan Africa, by 1966, was targeted for suppression; the student media were put down with the political movements that produced them, during the early 1970s; only Target

appears to be untouchable, and while it is progressive, its message is Christian and not revolutionary.

Scarcely visible to the distant researcher are the anonymous pamphleteers and publishers of evanescent newssheets. They rise up during crisis periods and are pursued by the authorities for seditious publishing and other crimes against public order. Alot mentions them during the "JM" crisis of 1975, and they are heard from again in the weeks before the coup in 1982.[100] This silencing of dissenting voices in print is only part of a larger "underside" to the Kenya of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes where, except for a brief and expedient window of political clemency following Moi's accession to power, writers, intellectuals and radical politicians have regularly been incarcerated under preventive detention laws.

Conclusions

The theoretical framework elaborated above to guide the analysis of state-media relations suggested four hypotheses about the differences in the way the state will treat different media (or the same media over time). The first hypothesis was that the state will be less concerned to regulate media intended for audiences that are closer in class terms to the dominant class than those intended for audiences less close. This hypothesis is only ambiguously confirmed for the independence period.

When one looks within media, there is no clear distinction by audience. The popular commercial press seems no more subject to regulation than the elite press, and one assumes that television news--watched only by the elite, apparently--is no less firmly controlled than is radio news.

However, if one considers that the elite press is the principal medium of the elite and VOK radio is the principal medium for the rest of the population, then certainly the former is considerably more independent of state surveillance in its news presentation. A recent survey of Kenyan media habits by Frank Ugboajah provides some evidence that this may be the case. Although the study only concerns rural and slum area residents, it finds VOK several times more likely to be relied on than either the English-language or Swahili press. For instance, residents of a Nairobi slum area, identifying the medium from which they got the most information (the actual question wording is not reported) were distributed as follows: VOK (72%), Nation (16%), Standard (3%) Nairobi Times (4%), Other (5%). Respondents in rural Homa Bay gave similar responses. Within both samples, the proportion relying on the English-language press rose sharply (14% to 45% for the Nairobi group) when categorized by level of education. Ugboajah does not present the full results from a middle-class suburb, but notes the overall figures for VOK (57%) and Nation (30%). The previous trend by education suggests that for the highest educated of this last group, the proportion relying on VOK might be less than 50%. He concludes, "This high percentage newspaper readership in a class of higher socio-economic status shows a trend that the more elite the Kenyan is, the more he prefers the Daily Nation."[101]

The hypothesis that those media sources closest in class terms to the ruling class would be less subject to state control than those further away is definitely confirmed. Here there seems no doubt when one looks at the obstacles put in the way of non-

elite communicators of any sort gaining access to Kenyan audiences. The virtually total absence of "other voices" in the Kenyan media is the strongest confirmation of this hypothesis.

The third hypothesis stated that media addressed to audiences in a non-hegemonic relation to the ruling class would be more strictly controlled than those over which the ruling class exercised hegemony. It is difficult to draw this comparison unambiguously. If one compares media across classes, it is impossible to determine if the differences in state treatment of the media are due to the differences in the hegemonic character of the relationship or simply due to the differences in the classes addressed. The only unambiguous comparison would be one within classes over time. Here the record is contradictory. For both the elite and the popular classes, it is the case that the fragile hegemony enjoyed by the state at Independence was strengthened up through the mid- to late 1970s. There is an easing of the state's interventions with regard to the elite press after 1966, though, as we have seen, that shift is also bound up with the elimination of internal divisions within the regime. However, for the popular classes, there does not seem to be any significant shift in the character of state involvement in the media communicating with them. Both VOK and the popular press have operated in essentially the same way, at least as far as is discernible from the evidence, since Independence. Perhaps VOK became internally more flexible in its news coverage over time, but I have found no evidence to suggest that.

The final hypothesis was that, for audiences with whom the ruling class is in a hegemonic relation, the state's concern would

be to regulate the terms of the political discourse employed rather than to control the medium itself. This hypothesis would seem to be confirmed. The Kenyan state's ideology of the press, besides being ambiguous enough to justify state interventions when necessary, is constructed to indicate the boundaries of legitimate political discourse. By spelling out the press's obligations to support the nation's development efforts and not to confuse the people, state ideology suggests the terms by which political discourse is to be framed. Such criteria may not rule many topics out definitively as subjects for discussion in print, but they do indicate the ways in which those topics may be addressed. If an editor is to raise a sensitive issue in an editorial, for instance, he or she must construct the discussion so as to include assurances that the shibboleths of national development and national unity are not impugned or ignored.

In summary, the patterns of state/media relations described in this paper offer general support for the specific expectations suggested by the theoretical framework, although they by no means provide an unambiguous confirmation. The variations in state interventions strongly suggest, however, the inadequacy of approaches that conceptualize the state in class-neutral terms and the equal inadequacy of approaches that assimilate <u>a priori</u> mass media institutions to the status of instruments of ideological reproduction. State practices and media practices are conceptually distinct, though necessarily tightly intertwined.

ENDNOTES

1 See, for instance, Graham Mytton, Mass Communication in Africa (London: Edward Arnold, 1983); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956); idem., "Communication Systems and Social Systems" in Mass Communications, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1960), pp. 131-40; Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: the Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); E. Lloyd Sommerlad, The Press in Developing Countries (Sidney, Australia: Sidney University Press, 1966); Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1966); idem., "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Comparative Politics, eds. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1963); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).

2 See, for Africa, William A. Hachten, Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1971); Rosalynde Ainslie, The Press in Africa: Communications Past and Present (London: Victor Gollancz, 1966); Frank Barton, The Press of Africa: Persecution and Perseverance (London: Macmillan, 1979); Dennis L. Wilcox, Mass Media in Black Africa: Philosophy and Control (New York: Praeger, 1975).

3 For instance, Herbert I. Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1976).

4 The arguments and analyses developed in this paper derive from the author's M.A. thesis, "State-Media Relations in Kenya: A Comparison of the Colonial and Independence Periods" (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986), where they are set forth at greater length. A more detailed interim version of the theoretical argument is my "Class Struggle, Information, and the State: Controls on the Media in Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Systems," (unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1984).

5 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward and Investigation," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-186; Göran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 23-125.

6 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1973).

7 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. & trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

8 A familiar example is Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980) but this understanding of the concept is common usage in the field.

9 Adam Przeworski, "Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System," in Political Power and Social Theory, ed. Maurice Zeitlin, Vol. 1 (New York: JAI Press, 1978).

10 Ibid., p. 28; italics added.
11 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
12 Ibid., p. 32
13 Jon Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism," Theory and Society 11:4 (July 1980), pp. 464-470.
14 Peter Mwaura, Communication Policies in Kenya (Paris: Unesco, 1980), p. 32, puts the number of Kenyans for whom English is a major language at 16-17 percent. These data are from 1977.
15 This stratification is noted in James F. Scotton, "The Press in Kenya a Decade After Independence: Patterns of Readership and Ownership," Gazette 21:1 (1975): 21.
16 See, for example, the brief note in James F. Scotton, "Kenyan students are guided into investigative journalism," Journalism Educator 41:3 (1986): 21, that many of "Nairobi's shoeshine boys, charcoal sellers, parking boys and sidewalk vendors. . . had considerable education...."
17 William A. Hachten, "The Press in a One-Party State: Kenya since Independence," Journalism Quarterly 42:2 (1965): 264.
18 Carla Wilson Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya: Policy and Politics 1928-1984" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1986), p. 313.
19 Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918-1977 (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 279.
20 Ibid., p. 280.
21 See, for instance, the text of Kenyatta's address to the International Press Institute Conference in Nairobi, 1968, in Africa Today 16:3 (1969): 5-6, or the address by Mwai Kibaki, then minister of finance, to a meeting of East African journalists in 1972, quoted extensively in Barton, The Press of Africa, pp. 278-79.
22 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
23 Weekly Review, 18 October 1976, where Gecaga's family and corporate connections are discussed explicitly.
24 Swainson, Corporate Capitalism, p. 280.
25 Ainslie, The Press in Africa, p. 103; Scotton, "Press in Kenya," p. 20.
26 Ibid.; Magaga Alot, People and Communication in Kenya (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1982), p. 193.
27 Scotton, "Press in Kenya, " p. 21.
28 George Githii, "Press Freedom in Kenya," in Reporting Africa, ed., Olav Stokke (New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1971), pp. 60-61.
29 Barton, Press of Africa, p. 93.
30 Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 313.
31 Barton, Press of Africa, p. 93.
32 Weekly Review, 18 October 1976.
33 EAS, 26 September 1969, announced the closing of the News; Mwaura, Communication Policies, p. 66, gives the Post's demise.
34 Barton, Press of Africa, p. 81.

35 Barton, The Press of Africa, p. 81; Alot, People and Communication in Kenya, pp. 178-79.
36 Barton, The Press of Africa, p. 95; IPI Report, May 1983, August 1984.
37 Mwaura, Communication Policies in Kenya, p. 65; Ainslie, Press in Africa, p. 103.
38 Hachten, Muffled Drums, p. 213.
39 Hachten, "Press in a One-Party State," p. 264; Scotton, "Press in Kenya," p. 21.
40 Harold A. Nelson (ed.), Kenya: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Govt. Printing Office, 1983) p. 296.
41 Personal communication from Waithira Gikonyo, Nov. 7, 1986.
42 Scotton, "Press in Kenya," p. 21; Hachten's estimate of 30,000 in 1964 is probably too high.
43 Africa South of the Sahara (1982-83 edition): 553; Nelson, Kenya: A Country Study, p. 296; Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 313.
44 Ainslie, Press in Africa, p. 106; on Githii's anti-Communist crusade in the Nation, see Alot, People and Communication in Kenya, pp. 184-85.
45 Scotton, "Press in Kenya," pp. 27, 23.
46 Ibid., pp. 28-33.
47 These estimates are based on recalculations of figures provided in Scotton, "Press in Kenya," p. 24, for the period July-December 1972.
48 Ibid., pp. 22-23, 27.
49 This is not a comprehensive list of Kenyan publications, of course, but it includes all I am aware of that concerned themselves at least in part with politics and other matters of public concern.
50 Ainslie, Press in Africa, pp. 118-119; Alot, People and Communication in Kenya, pp. 193-199.
51 On this uprising, see Patricia Stamp, "Kenya's Year of Discontent," Current History 82 (March 1983): 102-105, 126-27; Africa Research Bulletin, (August 1-31, 1982): 6559-6564; and "Kenya: the End of an Illusion," Race & Class 24:3 (1983): 221-244.
52 Alot, People and Communication in Kenya, pp. 74-78.
53 Most of the information on Target comes from Ibid., pp. 97-103.
54 EAS, 3 September 1969.
55 See, for instance, William A. Hachten, World News Prism, (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1981) and Rosemary Righter, Whose News? (New York: Times Press, 1978).
56 Kenyatta, "Address," p. 5.
57 Speech by P.J. Gachathi, Oct. 14, 1966, reproduced in C.J. Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt, and Don Rothchild (eds.), Government and Politics in Kenya: A Nation Building Text (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp. 495-96.
58 Kenya, Television Commission, p. 8.
59 Cited in Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 358.

60 Mwaura, Communication Policies, p. 41.
61 Quoted in Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 344. The financial condition of the Corporation was also a factor. Ibid., p. 348.
62 Quoted in Ibid., p. 349. See also, Mwaura, Communication Policies, p. 41.
63 Hachten, "Press in a One-Party State," p. 263.
64 Hachten, Muffled Drums, p. 206; Mwaura, Communication Policies, p. 37.
65 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Information Annual Report 1965, p. 5.
66 Eric Marsden, "The White Journalist in Black Africa," IPI Report (December 1970): 8-9. See also below.
67 "Broadcasting in Kenya," pp. 359-60.
68 Ibid. p. 360.
69 Gertzel et al., Government and Politics in Kenya, p. 497.
70 This characterization of the KPU-KANU division broadly follows Leys and other Marxist observers. See Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1975), especially Ch. 7, and P. Anyang' Nyong'o, "Class Struggles in Kenya," Mawazo 5:2 (Dec. 1983): 25-42.
71 The story of the Odinga-Kenyatta split is told in many places. See, among others, Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-68 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House. 1970); and David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1982).
72 See, in addition to Marsden, "White Journalist," the anecdotal information provided in Hachten, "Press in a One-Party State."
73 Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 325.
74 Hachten, "Press in a One-Party State," p. 266
75 Ibid., p. 265
76 Ibid., p. 263; Heath, "Broadcasting in Africa," p. 249.
77 Gertzel et al., Government and Politics, p. 498.
78 Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, p. 301.
79 Heath, "Broadcasting in Africa," p. 325.
80 See news reports in EAS, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22 February and 14 March 1966.
81 This totals 24 editorials between 17 February and 11 June 1966.
82 EAS, 11 March 1966.
83 EAS, 17 March 1966.
84 EAS, 24 March 1966.
85 EAS, 25 March 1966.
86 Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," p. 361-362.
87 See above.
88 Y. P. Ghai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 440.
89 Ghai & McAuslan, Public Law, p. 450.
90 Ibid., p. 451.
91 Ibid.

92 It was under these powers that Vice President Moi, as Minister for Home Affairs, banned the radical journal Africa and the World in 1966.
93 Ghai & McAuslan, Public Law, p. 453.
94 Ibid., p. 451, 454.
95 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Information Annual Report 1969, p.7.
96 See the perceptive analysis of the role of harambee projects in the delicate balance of Kenyan political stability in Heath, "Broadcasting in Kenya," pp. 371-378.
97 The paragraphs that follow are based on the events covered in EAS, 1 July 1-31 December 1969.
98 Marsden, "White Journalist."
99 I am somewhat hesitant in asserting this, for two reasons. First, my heavy reliance on secondary sources means I am at the mercy of other scholars' interests, which have tended to focus on the English-language press. Second, my ignorance of Swahili means that I cannot verify others' characterizations of the "non-political" content of these papers for myself.
100 Alot, People and Communication in Kenya, p. 8; Patricia Stamp, "Kenya's Year of Discontent," Current History 82 (Mar. 1983): 105.
101 Frank Okwu Ugboajah, "Media Habits of Rural and Semi-Rural (Slum) Kenya" Gazette 36 (1985): 161-162.

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